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Sources of Divorce Theories
Whether one accepts the Biblical version of the crea-
tion or adopts a theory of that event as advanced by
scientists and biologists, yet it is universally admitted that
even as nature planted the germ of attraction between the
sexes just so were sown the seeds of discord and dis-
content. So it has been through all time that side by side
have existed happy marriages and unions entirely lacking
in felicity. In some instances it was the civil govern-
ment that formulated the marriage contract and authorized
its existence, while in others it was the religious leader of
the race from whom such authority was derived. Whether
Buddha, Mohammed, Confucius or the Sun itself, or
whether the doctrines of Jesus of Nazareth controlled the
religious life of the individual, in a large measure de-
termined the attitude toward marriage and home life.
Even as a wide diversity of views existed toward marriage,
just so there has ever been a difference in the thoughts of
the individual in regard to the severance of the marriage
relation. The same variance in relation to marriage-
founded as it has been upon religious beliefs-is found in
relation to divorce. States and nations have legislated
upon the subject, have even banned it entirely; but never-
theless the individual has demanded that there be some
arrangement by which unhappy bonds may be severed. In
the history of divorce legislation the pendulum has swung
from one extreme to the other, touching every conceivable
theory until there has evolved finally an American attitude
that is distinctive and characteristic of the race that gave
it birth. Even today there are extremes in divorce laws
such as in South Carolina where no divorces are granted
and in Nevada where they are handed out with a celerity
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that astonishes. These are not typical and a student of the
subject will easily reach the conclusion that husband and
wife have equal rights before the courts and that each
cause or complaint must be proven with scrupulous
exactitude. The era of modern divorce legislation in the
United States began less than a century ago and a better
understanding of the attitude of the legislatures and of
the courts lies in knowledge of the steps, that have been
taken by the human race toward the goal that seems to be
attained.
Hebrew Divorces
It has been said truthfully that certain classes of
Jewish law are "mountains hanging by a hair" and there
is little doubt that divorce legislation among the Hebrews
falls within this classification. In Israel, marriage was
looked upon as the foundation of and the means for a
chaste and holy life. As adultery undermines such a
foundation, marriage ought to be dissolved by it; so the
Mosaic law determined. However, the whole spirit of
Judaism was opposed to divorcing at all and the first
recognition of the right to divorce came in case adultery
was proven. In that event it was lawful to give a bill of
divorcement and put the guilty party out of the home
because further cohabitation would be unlawful. Gr adu-
ally the law expanded and developed until the bill of
divorcement could be given whenever there was any
uncleanness found in the wife. A curious phase of the law
was that regardless of the guilt or innocence of the party
divorced, the divorce could be granted at the instance of
the husband alone. On him was the duty of appearing be-
fore the religious leaders and there publicly announcing
that he divorced his wife. The bill of divorcement was not
given by authority of the church or of the civil govern-
ment, but was given by the authority of the husband alone
and the duty of the rabbis before whom he announced his
intention was simply to reduce that declaration to writing.
Certain technical phrases had to be used and some formal
statements made, and this combination when finally writ-
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ten was the bill of divorcement given to the wife. The
delivery of this bill to the wife created an absolute divorce
and either party was free to remarry at will.' Even today
there lingers a ghost of the old law in the desire of many
Hebrews to secure a bill of divorcement from a rabbi even
after the civil authorities have legally dissolved the union.
Greek and Roman Divorces
The ancients realized the necessity for divorce legisla-
tion and even while the Jewish husbands were appearing
before rabbis to have bills of divorcement transcribed, so
other nations were developing arv attitude toward the
subject. With the Greeks there was little adverse action
required and mere agreement of the parties to be divorced
and the registration of that intention at a central office
seems to have been all that was necessary. In Rome,
however, the severity, dignity and high standards of the
traditional Roman matron for a long time made divorce
on any ground impossible. For more than five hundred
years of the history of Rome the sanctity of the marriage
relation and the worship of the Lares and Penates made
marriage something to be severed only by death.' With
the decline of the power and majesty of the Roman Empire
and the corresponding decline in individual virtues, corrup-
tion and dissolution crept into the life of the individual
and divorces were legalized. Soon Roman jurisprudence
regarded husband and wife as having equal rights before
the law and divorces were granted upon the petition of
either party. Justinian recognized the many evils attend-
ant upon the easy severance of marital relations and by
imperial decree abolished divorces and forbade the civil
authorities to grant them for any cause. Soon however,
he was compelled to rescind this decree and restore
unlimited divorces, giving as the reason for this reversal
the misery, hatred and crime that flowed from indissoluble
unions. By his order mutual wish and consent were all
'Albany Law Journal, Vol. 8, Page 292.
2Schouler's Domestic Relations, 1st Edition.
3Ruling Case Law, Vol. 9, Page 243.
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that were necessary to secure a divorce and with this
doctrine once firmly established, the Roman home was
doomed and with it the Empire itself.
French Divorces
French divorces find their foundation in the Code of
Napoleon which admitted divorces for several causes, but
vested the decision regarding them in the individual.
Mutual consent was the prime requirement but when it
was lacking the tribunal before which an application was
made might decree a divorce for any reason that seemed
proper to the judges. Modern divorce legislation in France
has gone far from this provision of the old Code but the
facility with which decrees are secured seems to have re-
mained.
English Common Law
According to Blackstone divorces were entirely within
the cognizance of the ecclesiastical courts and not part of
the common law. They were of two kinds, one total and
the other partial. The former, or divorce a vinculo matri-
monii, was granted only for one of the canonical causes of
impediment existing before marriage, such as affinity, and
the theory of the total decree was that the marriage was
null and void ab initio.4 The partial decree, or decree a
mensa et thoro, was granted when the marriage was origin-
ally lawful, but for some cause such as cruelty or adultery it
became improper or impossible for the parties to continue
cohabitation. The canon law was closely followed by the
common law which regarded the nuptial tie with such
reverence and awe that the latter would not permit a
divorce to be granted for any cause arising after marriage.
This attitude was claimed to be founded upon divine law
and religious beliefs and even though the latter expressly
defined infidelity as a cause for divorce, yet the common
law would not recognize that, on the ground that divorces
should not be allowed to depend upon any matter or cause
'Ruling Case Law, Vol. 9, Page 243.
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wholly within the control of the parties. Canonical de-
crees were often granted upon the uncorroborated confes-
sions of the parties, and, as this grew to be more and more
frequent, the attitude of the common law sought to provide
a check on divorces.
The English Divorce Act of 1858 codified divorce
legislation to a great extent and provided for the granting
of decrees by the civil courts. The theory of the ecclesi-
astical courts and the stern and unrelenting attitude of
the common law permeates and animates this modern
legislation.5
American Common Law
Ecclesiastical law concerning divorces as that law
existed in England never became a part of the common
law in the United States. Ecclesiastical law was admin-
istered by courts and judges that never existed in the
American colonies and the jurisdiction exercised by these
courts was never specifically granted to any of the Ameri-
can courts. It is true that the theory and rules of proced-
ure and practice of the ecclesiastical courts have been
followed rather closely in some of the United States, so
that in interpreting modern divorce statutes recourse must
be had to church doctrines. It has been held also that
when jurisdiction formerly exercised by ecclesiastical
courts is vested by statute in a modern American court,
the settled principles of the former become the fixed
guides for the latter.6 These precedents from the ecclesi-
astical courts are followed most closely whenever ques-
tions involving the effect of condonation and connivance
are considered. Likewise, in this country a suit for divorce
on the charge of desertion is our substitute for the English
libel for restitution of conjugal rights and the rules gov-
erning each proceeding are practically the same. So it has
been held that a legislature in providing that desertion
should constitute a valid cause for divorce used the word
3Schouler's Domestic Relations, 1st Edition.
OHawkins v. Hawkins, 193 N. Y. 409, 10 Am. State Reports 460.
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in the same sense as used by the earliest English courts."
The same analogy has been applied in a case in which the
statute failed to define the word "cruelty" as ground for
a divorce, because here again precedents were sought in
ecclesiastical law. Therefore, while it is true that ecclesi-
astical law never became a part of American common
law, yet its spirit has shaped and fashioned modern divorce
legislation to a greater extent than is generally realized.
Colonial Divorces
Some little dispute exists regarding the earliest divorce
legislation in the American colonies and this arises not so
much out of the facts as it does from a too casual examin-
ation of them. The historian Bancroft makes no mention
of divorces in the early colonies and his failure to give
them notice is the authority of those who contend the
colonists did not sanction divorces for any cause what-
ever.8 Palfrey, however, in his history mentions the fact
that inferior courts had jurisdiction in divorce cases.9 This
brief notice of the fact of early American divorces is enough
to spur an investigation of colonial records to ascertain
the facts.
Massachusetts, according to the historian Hutchison,
took the lead in constituting divorce courts.'" In the early
annals of that colony there is a definite record that in 1639
courts of appeal were constituted to hear cases of "divorce,
capital and criminal causes." '  The first decree granted by
these courts is a matter of record and seems to prove that
Massachusetts was the first American colony to provide
for the severance of the marriage relation."
In Rhode Island, which closely followed the Massa-
chusetts rule at first, the General Assembly had
jurisdiction of divorce cases, but only on the ground of
7Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327.
SAlbany Law Journal, Vol. 20, Page 110.
OPalfrey's History of New England, Vol. 2, Page 17.
10History of Massachusetts, Vol. 1, Page 393.
"Massachusetts Colony Records, Vol. 1, Page 276.
l 2Massachusetts Colony Records, Vol. 1, Page 283.
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adultery. Connecticut followed the Massachusetts rule
exactly by a statute adopted in 1656.13
In 1692 the Massachusetts rule was changed and the
power to divorce was given to the Governor and the Coun-
cil and this law continued in force until the Revolution.
The Biblical Digest which was prepared in 1656 gave
desertion and adultery as grounds for divorce and cited
Scriptural authority for this enactment. According to the
Digest, which was adopted as law by Massachusetts, Con-
necticut and Rhode Island, the grounds for divorce were
stated by Governor Winthrop as "the officers of the body
politic have a rule to walk by in all their administrations
which rule is the word of God and such conclusions and
deductions as are or shall be regularly drawn from
thence."' 1
Connecticut took authority to grant divorces from the
General Assembly in 1672 and vested it in the Governor
and his Assistants. In 1677 in that same state the rule was
laid down that no divorce should be granted except upon
adultery, desertion for three years and fraud.'5
No statutes of New York regarding divorces seem to
remain extant but that there were such is unquestioned.
The records of the courts of the patroons at Albany show
at least three divorces granted between 1630 and 1664 and
the records of the same court show divorces granted with
greater frequency between 1664 and 1776 while the English
were in charge of that colony.16
George the Third took cognizance of the matter of
divorces in the colonies and in 1773 gave instructions to all
Provincial Governors, including the Governor of Canada,
that no divorces were to be granted for any cause. Despite
the influence of Henry the Eighth the English law still held
to the idea of an indissoluble marriage. These instruc-
tions were obeyed in some colonies which were loyal to the
crown, but in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecti-
13Albany Law Journal, Vol. 20, Page 133.
14Life and Letters of John Winthrop, Vol. 2, Page 445.
25Albany Law Journal, Vol. 20, Page 134.
16A)bany Law Journal, Vol. 20, Page 134.
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cut they were absolutely ignored, and to some extent they
were disobeyed in New York.' 7 The reason for the dis-
obedience of the royal decree regarding divorces lay in
the fact that in the colonies marriage was regarded as a
civil contract and not a religious sacrament. This theory
was a necessity, since no pioneer could well forge a home
out of the wilderness without a wife to aid him, and
marriages were performed by the civil and not by the
religious authorities. Following in logical order, since
marriage was a civil matter, its dissolution was a civil mat-
ter also, and divorces should be granted by the courts,
according to the reasoning of the colonists. The colonial
laws relating to marriages and divorces did not seek to
create new causes for divorce or new principles on the
subject; they sought merely to meet existing conditions in
a way that seemed fair and just to all parties concerned,
and by a procedure that could not be controlled by any
ecclesiastical authorities.'8
Divorce Theories
Roman jurisprudence regarded husband and wife as
distinct persons having equal rights, but this was not the
theory of the English common law. 9 The latter emphasized
unity as the cardinal principle and to secure this the legal
entity of the wife was either extinguished or suspended
during coverture. The scheme of the Civil law pays scant
attention to this idea of unity which was mere theory and
legal fiction. The community system in force in some
states is an intermediary between the common law and
modern Civil systems. The religious theories of divorce
have as wide a variance as the legal theories. The Church
of Rome has ever held marriage to be indissoluble and
refuses to recognize the validity of a civil divorce, at least
so far as freeing the individual and making him eligible to
remarry.
The Hebrew theory parallels the Catholic idea and
"7Albany Law Journal, Vol. 20, Page 135.
28 Divorce in New England by Charles Cowley.
1 9Schouler's Domestic Relations, 1st Edition.
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refuses to sanction civil decrees until and unless there is a
bill of divorcement prepared by a rabbi along the lines laid
down by the Mosaic law.
Many elements and influences have combined to shape
the modern theory of divorce in the United States. One
of the most prominent of these influences lies in the "Mar-
ried Women's Acts" adopted by nearly every state in the
union. These emancipate a married woman from the
unity idea of the common law and give her almost un-
bridled freedom in the management of her temporal
affairs. This liberty in handling her own money exercised
a liberalizing influence on the right of a woman to sue and
be sued and also on her right to divorce her husband for
cause shown.20
Possibly the greatest influence on divorce legislation
has been the spirit of Christianity. While the dictates of
the Nazarene have received wide and various interpreta-
tion and while the Protestant sects and denominations can-
not agree upon the subject, yet it is the Christian rule
that has shaped the policy of civil governments. Jesus of
Nazareth taught men to respect womanhood and laid down
adultery as the one cause for divorce. In applying the
Christian doctrinel it is true that the causes for divorce as
recognized by law have been enlarged and increased, yet
it is the spirit of this great teacher that has led the law to
grant divorces to women who have been outraged by their
husbands. The varied causes for divorce, as now expressed
in statutes, are the product of many elements indeed, not
only historical and ecclesiastical, but fanatical and liberal,
as well as the remnants and heritages of the stern Puritans
who first constituted divorce courts in New England.
Federal Divorce Laws
The varied and many causes recognized in the several
states, the various requirements for jurisdiction and the
diverse rules of procedure regarding service and practice
have combined in recent years to direct discussion in favor
20Schouler's Dofestic Relations, lt Fition.
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of a federal divorce law and the granting of divorces by
federal courts. While it is true that such a federal law
would contribute to uniformity that is now sadly lacking,
yet serious objections to such a measure arise out of the
past as well as the present. Ours is a government of dele-
gated powers and nowhere in the Constitution is there a
delegation to the federal courts of the right to grant
divorces, which was so early exercised by the colonial
courts. To permit such a federal law to become operative
one must stretch the Constitution to the breaking point or
further amend a document that has been amended all too
often in recent generations by provisions that more proper-
ly should be in the form of substantive law. In addition,
government today is both bureaucratic and paternalistic
and much of the present high taxation can be attributed to
these influences. Modern divorce legislation by the federal
government would only serve to increase these patern-
alistic tendencies beyond all natural bounds and would
make the detriments to such a law far outweigh its bene-
fits.
Modern Theories
Marriage contracts are not on the same footing as
ordinary contracts and it is well settled now that the
parties cannot agree to compromise or modify at will. The
Biblical injunction is that the obligations of the marriage
state are to be preserved and well guarded. The govern-
ment, in theory and to a great extent in actual practice,
guards the sanctity of the marriage even as it demands
obedience and loyalty from its citizens. The control over
divorce belongs not to the individual, but to the public be-
cause it is the common weal and the doctrine of the greater
good for the greater number that should control the power
to divorce.2' While there may be conflict of laws at pres-
ent and modern legislation appears to proceed on varied
theories, yet there are certain fixed principles that have
been set as guiding stars by which divorce courts are to
chart their courses. Marriage is a contract, quasi-civil in
'1Schouler's Domestic Relations, 1st Edition.
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character, but with a religious element ever present; a type
of contract that requires more than ordinary honesty on
the part of the parties thereto. It requires the highest
good faith both at its inception and in its continuance and
the contracting parties are ever charged to exercise the
greatest honesty and confidence. Less than this impairs
the contract and for the good of the state, namely, to
check the misery and crime springing from unhappy unions,
a divorce may be granted.2
The home is the basis of the state because there cit-
izens are made and no nation can rise higher than the
product of its homes. Governments are vitally interested
in conserving the sanctity of the home, but on the other
hand, simple justice demands that an erring spouse be pun-
ished and a breach of the marriage contract not be con-
doned. To serve these two ends seems to be the special
province of modern divorce courts. How they act to meet
the problems before them will determine, in a large
measure, the destiny of the republic.
There are urgent problems to be solved by the divorce
courts of the nations. There are situations that existing
statutes do not provide for and there is a state of flux in
respect to divorce legislation. How society will meet the
problems of this modern day with respect to domestic rela-
tions it is difficult to predict. But the bald fact remains
that our divorce statutes are not perfect and that changes
must be made. What those changes will be and how
modern legislation will act to solve the needs of this gen-
eration remains to be seen. Legislators have before them
the records of the past. The experience of generations
long dead presents a fund of information to be used in
providing laws for the present. Society must meet the
"divorce evil", if such exists, and must provide for litiga-
tion arising out of unhappy marriages, for truly this is one
of the great problems of the day. The centuries look down
on us who have the record and the benefit of the experi-
22Penna. Legal Journal, No. 3, Page 292.
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ence of many generations and if we fail to balance the
scales of justice, then with Shakespeare we must say,
"The fault, dear Brutus, is not with our stars,
But with ourselves, that we are underlings."
Carlisle, Penna. JACOB M. GOODYEAR.
